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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law - Service of Process on Unincorporated Unions -
The plaintiff, a train conductor and member of defendant union,
commenced a suit against the defendant to recover damages alleged
to have resulted from a violation of his rights as a member of the
defendant union. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was an
unincorporated voluntary association. It further operated an insur-
ance department as a collateral activity, this section being incorpo-
rated under the laws of Ohio. Upon commencement of the action
a summons was issued directing the sheriff of Dawes County, Ne-
braska, to notify the "Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen" that it
had been sued. The sheriff's return showed that the summons was
served by leaving a copy at its usual place of doing business in the
county, with the secretary-treasurer of the defendant association.
The return further recited that the summons was further served
by delivering a copy to its president, the Director of the Department
of Insurance, and to the Auditor of Public Accounts. The defendant
appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant. Held: That in the absence of a statute
authorizing such procedure, an unincorporated society or association
could not be sued by its name in Nebraska as an entity, and that
no one of the services recited in the sheriff's return gave the court
jurisdiction of the person of defendant. Hurley v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen 25 N.W. (2d) 29 (Nebraska, 1946).
In cases involving the suability of a union, one of the most con-
sistently quoted maxims is that at common law, an unincorporated
association cannot ordinarily sue or be sued in its own name.' This
rule was adopted by the court in the principal case. It has been said
"that the real reason for the decisions (that unincorporated associa-
tions are not legal entities separate from their members) is the con-
clusion of the courts that to sue or be sued in the association name
is exclusively 'corporate' legal relations, which will not be accorded
to the associates in the absence of grant from the sovereign." 2 This
is the view in most states in the absence of enabling statutes., Ad-
mitting that most state legislatures have not passed such statutes,
it appears that they all have recognized in many other laws the exis-
tence of such unincorporated unions as entities, and it can be argued
that an inference is created thereby that the legislatures in dealing
I Green County Law Library Assoc. v. Curlett, 63 N.E. (2d) 455 (1945).2 
"Unincorporated Assoc. as Parties to Actions," 33 Yale Law Journal 394 at
page 400 (1924).3 Milam v. Settle, 32 S.E. (2d) 269 (W.Va. 1944); Baskins v. United Mine
Workers, 150 Ark 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass 590
(1906); St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Union, 94 Minn. 351 (1905).
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with them as separate entities intend that they be responsible parties
and thus by implication authorize the bringing of such suits for
and against them.
The United States Supreme Court, permitting such suits, noted
in the Coronado case,' that, "The growth and necessities of these
great labor organizations have brought affirmative legal recognition
of their existence and usefulness and provision for their protection
which their members have found necessary." The court then pointed
out that while means of suing such associations had not been spe-
cifically provided by statute, the fact that they were recognized in
many ways by other statutes showed the legislative intent that they
should be separate entities capable of suing and being sued and pro-
ceeded to allow a representative suit against one of them. The logic
of this decision is today embodied into the federal rules.5
Nebraska has seen fit to allow such organizations to register their
names with the secretary of state, after which the names may not
be used by others.8 Further that state has given labor unions the
right to sue to enjoin infringement of registered union labels or
trademarks ;7 has made such misuse a criminal offense ;s has made
embezzlement of funds of labor unions a special offense;9 and by
judicial decision has exempted them from th eanti-trust laws.'0 Thus
it would seem that while the court holds the union not to be a suable
entity, yet the legislature daily deals with it in other laws as such.
Many other jurisdictions have provided by statute for representa-
tive suits for or against unincorporated associations in the name of
one or more members, and usually these statutes provide for the
method of service of process." Equitable procedure, adapting itself
to these needs, has grown to recognize the need of representation by
one person of many too numerous to sue or be sued.1 2 Such enact-
ments permit these associations to sue and be sued in their adopted
4United Mine Workers v. Coronado, 259 U.S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 60 L. ed.
975 (1922); Comment on Coronado Case, 5 Ill. Law. Qtly. 200 (1922).
5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 (b) provides: "that a partnership or other
unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law of such state,
may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or
against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the
United States."
Nebraska Revised Statutes (1943) 21-617 and 21-620.7
.Nebraska Revised Statutes (1943) 87-109.
8Nebraska Comp. Statutes (1911) 4169-4173.9 Nebraska Rev. Statutes (1913) 8659.10 102 Neb. 768 (1918). 169 N.W. 717.
"79 ALR 306; Hamilton v. Delaware Motor Trades, Inc., 4 Harr. (Del.) 486, 155
AtI. 595 (1931); Branson v. Industrial Workers, 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354(1908) ; F. R. Patch Mfg. Co. v. Capeless Lodge, 79 Vt. 1, 63 Atl. 938 (1906) ;
U.S. Heater Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 129 Mich. 354, 88 N.W. 889 (1902).
2St. Germain v. Bakery and Union 97 Wash. 282 (1917); 166 P 665; 232 Ill. 402;
83 NE 932 (1908).
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name,'3 or in the name of their officers, trustees et cetera ;14 while other
statutes authorize actions against but not by certain associations. 5
Such statutes are constitutional, and are to be construed in the light
of the purpose of their enactment. 16 Such statutes have been held
to have no extra-territorial force or effect.'7
However an express statutory provision is not indispensible to
an association's capacity to sue or be sued in its associate name;
such a suit may be maintained by virtue of a necessary implication
arising from statutory provisions, 8 as in cases where an unincorpo-
rated association is recognized as a legal entity by statute which does
not in terms authorize it to sue or be sued.19
In Wisconsin the question seems to be settled by judicial decision,
in the absence of express statutory provisions authorizing repre-
sentative suits, service to be made upon the officers.2° In the par-
ticular case, lack of jurisdiction of the person of defendant due
to improper service of process was alleged as a defense. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court noted the allegation but made no specific de-
termination of the point in its decision. Nevertheless, the court
determined other points of pleading and the merits of the case. Thus
a capacity to be sued was presumed, though denied by defendant.
The court in determining the merits, must have determined that the
service of process was adequate, for without jurisdiction of the person
of defendant, the court would have improperly decided upon the
merits. A union has also been held a proper party plaintiff in Wis-
consin.2' Under the Employment Peace Act of Wisconsin,2 the
method of service in Labor disputes is provided for in actions before
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, and appeal of such dis-
putes from .the Board to Circuit Court. Whether this statute would
apply to actions other than labor disputes appears to be an undeter-
mined question.
In considering whether an unincorporated association could be
made a party to a suit the Supreme Court pointed out,23 in a case
3 70 ALR 71 - Jardine v. Superior Court, 2 P (2d) 756, Calif. (1931) ; St. Paul
v. St. Paul BookBinders' Union, 102 NW 725, (1905) ; Patch Mfg. Co. v. Pro-
tection Lodge, 60 AtI. 74, (1905).
14 McCabe v. Goodfellow, 30 NE 94, Mass. (1885).
'5 Snowden v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 80 At1. 510, (1911).
16 Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P (2d) 751, 79 ALR 291, (1931), ap-
peal dismissed in 284 U.S. 592 (1931).
1 Edwards v. Warren Linoline & Gasoline Works, 47 N.E. 502, Mass (1897).
28 Brown v. U. S., 276 U. S. 134 (1927).
19 Clark v. Grand Lodge, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 43 SW (2d) 404,
Missouri (1931).
20Trade Press Publishing Co. v. Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23, 180
Wis. 449, 193 N.W. 507 (1923); Wisconsin Statutes 260.12 (1945).
21Trustees of Wis. State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., 215
Wis. 623, 256 N.W. 56 (1934).
22 Wisconsin Statutes 111..07 (2) a. (1945).
'Allis-Chalmers v. Iron Molder's Union No. 25, 150 F. 155 (1906)
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involving a Wisconsin corporation against four unions, that a trade
union in Wisconsin is simply an assemblage of persons and that no
statute of Wisconsin permits it to sue or be sued in its common name;
that its members may sue or be sued either by joining all of them
or one or more for all where the members are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all in, but that it is a suit of the
members, not of the uiion. In this case the defendants were four
unions, and a general appearance was entered in the names of the
four unions. The Court held that such appearance operated as a
waiver of any objection of nonjoinder of parties, and that individual
members not mentioned in the bill or sued in a personal or repre-
sentative capacity were not by the general appearance of all de-
fendants brought in or joined in any manner. So the objection might
have prevailed if it had been seasonably made, but the members could
have been reached of course, either by naming and serving them all
or if that were impracticable because of their numbers by suing some
as representatives of all. The representative suit is the only certain
means available.
It is unfortunate that great labor organizations may be free from
liability, for instance, for injuries from torts or for breach of con-
tract with their own members or others dealing in reliance upon their
responsibility. To all appearances the member here is left remediless
against the organization whose avowed purpose is to aid his station
in life. We think and speak of such associations as entities, the
law should treat them as such.
Under Federal rule 17(b) it would appear that if suit is brought
involving a Federal right, it may be instituted in the common name
of the union even though the rule of the state is otherwise. Most
jurisdictions have not adopted the Federal rule,2 and it is submitted
that such adoption by the several states would prevent the sacrificing
of substance to form. If such should be, the need for incorporation
of these bodies would be reduced.
WILLIAM P. MCENIRY
24 Ibid., Note 5.
[Vol. 30
